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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his forthcoming article, Revising State Post-Conviction Relief 
Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated Expert 
Testimony,1 Professor Edward Imwinkelried persuasively demonstrates how 
testimony based on flawed science has significantly contributed to wrongful 
convictions.2  In this thoughtful and methodical piece, Imwinkelried 
 
* Associate Dean of Students and Academic Affairs, Professor of Law and Val Nolan Faculty 
Fellow, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.  
 1  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Revising State Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover 
Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1095 (2018). 
 2   See generally M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: 
Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1–2 (2016) 
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provides a taxonomy outlining which type of requests for post-conviction 
relief based on discredited expert testimony should receive a new trial.  
Imwinkelried’s analysis is nuanced, acknowledging that scientific 
knowledge is not static and that “[a]bsolute certainty is beyond reach.”3  The 
reassessment of expert testimony and the development of new scientific 
techniques do not automatically exonerate the accused (as does, for instance, 
certain DNA evidence).  Instead, new science undermining old theories and 
techniques merely calls into question the basis of the conviction.4  
Imwinkelried suggests that a new trial should be granted when the validation 
of a new analytic technique results in a different conclusion from the expert 
technique presented at trial and the change is “so extensive that it either 
discredits the prior expert testimony or seriously undermines confidence in 
its correctness.”5  Noting that Texas and California have enacted statutes 
granting new trials in some circumstances where the conviction relied on 
flawed scientific testimony,6 Imwinkelried analyzes the wording and utility 
of the new statutes. 
Imwinkelried specifically and appropriately limits his inquiry to flawed 
science, the deficiencies of which were unknown at the time of trial.  If 
problems with the proposed expert testimony were known or knowable at 
 
(“The empirical evidence and data gathered here demonstrates that traditional forensic 
identification techniques, as well as the doctrines supporting them, are ultimately no more 
than a house of cards built on unvalidated hypotheses and unsubstantiated or non-existent 
data.”); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (analyzing the widespread effect of invalid 
science, finding that sixty percent of convictions of those later exonerated involved flawed 
forensic testimony, misstating or totally devoid of empirical data). 
 3  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1110. 
 4  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1137 (stating the hardest cases are where new 
scientific evidence raises serious concerns about the accuracy of the prior conviction but does 
not prove the accused’s undeniable innocence).  In such cases, “the courts and legislatures 
have a far more difficult policy choice; they must weigh the competing interests in accuracy 
and finality.”  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1137. 
 5  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1116. 
      6   A California statue grants new trial motions when a prior conviction rests on “false 
evidence.” As amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) now reads: 
 
For purposes of this section, “false evidence” includes opinions of 
experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally 
provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined 
by later scientific research or technological advances. 
 
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1098 n.15 (citing 1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE 
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK § 7:61 (2016)).  Texas’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides that a new trial is warranted if the accused presents testimony 
about expert research that “was not available . . . at the convicted person’s trial” or that 
“contradicts scientific evidence relied on by the state at trial.”  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. 
art. § 11.073(a) (West 2015). 
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trial, reliance on such expert evidence might qualify for post-conviction 
relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel;7 however, such flawed 
testimony is not the subject of Imwinkelried’s discussion.  Similarly, 
exaggerated expert testimony where the expert overstated reasonable 
conclusions or baselessly inflated the probability of guilt does not warrant a 
new trial based on changed science if the accused’s diligent inquiry could 
have exposed the overstatement via cross-examination or the introduction of 
a contradicting expert.8 
Although, doctrinally, Imwinkelried is undoubtedly correct in limiting 
his analysis to newly discovered scientific flaws in evidence, several 
interrelated issues arise from this limitation.  First, as I discuss in Part I, the 
line between changed science—to which the accused had no access—and 
inappropriate use of science that should have been detected and objected to 
at trial, is sometimes tricky to draw.  The understanding and evaluation of 
“changed” science is often filtered through judicial tradition, and sometimes 
the change occurs not in scientific innovation but in judicial attitude.  
Second, Part II considers how ineffective assistance of counsel caused by a 
defendant’s failure to object to known bad science indicates a systemic 
problem in the adversary system of which ineffective assistance is only one 
part.  Admission of science so objectionable that defense counsel is deemed 
constitutionally ineffective raises an important question about what the other 
two major players in the courtroom—the prosecutor and judge—were doing.  
Prosecutors, in particular, may face various institutional pressures, 
professional incentives, and psychological phenomena that prompt them to 
introduce and rely on bogus science or to unfairly overstate the expert 
testimony in closing.  Part II applies these institutional factors, especially 
pressures on prosecutors, to the challenges presented by changed science, 
and speculates about prosecutors’ resistance to new trials based on changed 
science.  Part III considers recent cultural trends towards new science and 
the politicization of science in general, which bode ill for challenging 
unproven “science” in the courtroom.  Finally, Part IV speculates on how to 
create structures and incentives that encourage the acceptance of new science 
and promote motions for new trials for those convicted under faulty science. 
 
 
 
 
 7  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1105 (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) 
(“Simply stated, when the defense counsel could feasibly have accessed the scientific research 
at the time of the accused’s original trial, there is no need to resort to special legislation such 
as the new California and Texas statutes.”).  
 8  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1105. 
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II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN KNOWN BOGUS SCIENCE THAT SHOULD 
HAVE DRAWN OBJECTION AND CHANGES IN SCIENCE THAT 
SHOULD TRIGGER REEXAMINATION OF CONVICTIONS 
The line between known problems with expert scientific testimony and 
changed science can be hard to draw.  Among the cases for which 
Imwinkelried advocates new trials are those that relied on expert evidence 
concerning bite marks and hair analysis, matching the accused to the victim 
and crime scene respectively.  In cases evoking such so-called expertise, 
questionable science arguably contributed to the accused’s conviction.9 
New science has conclusively refuted key pieces of forensic evidence 
and discredited the experts who offered it.  However, that does not obviate 
the fact that many of these experts made assertions that should have been 
challenged by the defense even without the new science.10  The new science 
offers more conclusive refutation, but the testimony was demonstrably 
flawed even without it.  Often, no foundation was laid for the reliability of 
the forensic testimony; experts relied on anecdotal experience or appealed to 
juror intuition without explaining or justifying their assumptions. 
Experts in bitemark and microscopic hair analysis often offered 
overblown conclusions and failed to provide proper foundations, thereby 
violating then-existing scientific norms.  For instance, experts conducting 
microscopic hair analysis overstated the probative value of finding two hair 
samples microscopically indistinguishable in identifying a perpetrator.  They 
regularly testified that in their experience it was very rare for them not to be 
able to tell hairs apart, a meaningless anecdotal boast.11  Additionally, such 
 
 9  Pema Levy, Jeff Sessions Wants Courts to Rely Less on Science and More on 
“Science,” MOTHER JONES (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/se
ssions-forensic-science/ (“Analyses regularly presented in courtrooms—using such evidence 
as bite marks, hair, and bullets—that for decades have been employed by prosecutors to 
convict and even execute defendants are actually incapable of definitively linking an 
individual to a crime.”).   
 10  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 82 (2008) (“To a 
surprising extent, the forensic testimony at trial was improper based on science at the time.”).  
Certainly, cases exist where the science improved and the expert at the original trial did 
nothing wrong.  For instance, imagine a case from the 1980s where an expert identified the 
accused’s blood type as being the same as type the perpetrator left at the crime scene.  If the 
expert did not inflate the probabilities, then the statement itself was based on the best science 
then available, and the defense was in no way ineffective.   
 11  See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 2, at 60 (discussing experts’ claims that among their 
thousands of cases they never encountered hairs which they could not microscopically 
distinguish); Jennifer L. Mnookin et. al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 731 (2011).  Because no individual examiner can ever 
examine every possible specimen in the universe, experience alone cannot justify a claim of 
individualization, assuming that the potential population of the source is substantial. Cf. Bos. 
Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. SUCV2013-1250-A, 2014 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
2427, at *8–9 (Oct. 6, 2014) (upholding civil commission’s ruling that police department 
lacked just cause to terminate six of ten officers because, standing alone, positive hair test for 
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experts never offered any empirical evidence that scientific testing had been 
done to establish an error rate for microscopic hair analysis.12  New science 
has enabled much more sophisticated matching of hairs to an individual 
based on mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA), whereby hairs from crime scenes 
that were originally matched to the accused were actually determined to 
come from other sources.13  Although experts can now conclusively rule out 
hair as not being from the accused, this does not address the fact that 
prosecution experts regularly made unsupported and unsupportable claims 
contravening Daubert.14 
Similarly, supposed expert forensic odontologists—members of a by-
and-large self-policing club that publishes a journal not subject to peer 
review—use the “trappings of science”15 to testify from photographs that 
certain marks on the victims matched the unique tooth configuration of the 
accused.  New developments in computer software that provide better 
imaging have revealed that many of the marks in question were not bite 
marks at all and certainly did not match the accused’s dentition.16  Although 
 
cocaine was insufficiently reliable to outweigh officers’ credible denial of drug use; 
commission noted that “[h]air testing for drugs . . . has not achieved general acceptance within 
the scientific or law enforcement communities,” and that “no uniform, nationally approved 
standards for hair testing exist, so that positive or negative test reports depend on different 
standards used by different laboratories at different times”). 
 12  Additionally, no foundation was offered that human hairs are unique to each person.  
Further complicating matters, hairs belonging to the same person differ significantly.  Garrett 
& Neufeld, supra note 2, at 61–63.  
 13  For example, Imwinkelried cites an FBI study, where of 80 hair comparisons in which 
microscopic analysts reported matches or associations, mtDNA analysis demonstrated that 
nine samples (12.5%) came from different persons. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1113–14 
nn.76–80 and accompanying text; see also Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 2, at 14–15 (“Of the 
65 cases involving microscopic hair comparison in which transcripts were located, 25 cases, 
or 38%, had invalid forensic science testimony.”). 
 14  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 15  Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2009) (“The testifying experts have advanced degrees, and 
often board certification.  They have two professional associations, with impressive names.  
They publish in their own professional journals.  They use the statistical product rule to come 
up with remote-sounding probability statements.  But those trappings do not make it 
science.”).   
 16  In 2009, the National Association of Sciences published a congressionally-
commissioned report on the state of forensic science in the courtroom entitled “Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward.” NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (NAS Report). Noting the high rate of 
false-positives, the report found that “the scientific basis is insufficient to conclude that bite 
mark comparisons can result in a conclusive match.” Id. at 174–75; see Garrett & Neufeld, 
supra note 2, at 67 (noting that marks considered by experts to be human bite marks are often 
merely post-mortem artifacts); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 15, at 1371–77, 1392 
(arguing the forensic odontology has no empirical basis, no objective standard, no population 
data establishing the frequency of dental patterns, no proof that human dentition is unique, no 
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we are more sophisticated in evaluating match ups, the rookie mistake of 
assuming, with no proof, that everyone’s bite mark is unique, the phony 
probabilities asserted by experts, and reliance on the untested personal 
observations of experts, who provided  no testing for error rate, were 
knowable problems that went unchecked before the scientific innovation.17  
For both microscopic hair analysis and bitemark matching, an honest 
assessment of what the science could tell us at the time of trial indicates that 
the defense was often ineffective.  An effective challenge to the baseless 
assertions and the lack of empirical evidence of testing for falsifiability 
would have excluded or diminished the expert testimony and made 
conviction less likely. 
Relatedly, it can be hard to pinpoint the moment the science changes.  
In Commonwealth v. Kunco,18 the court rejected post-conviction relief 
because, to the extent that the bitemark testimony was flawed, the defense 
should have known about the problems with such testimony years before the 
National Academy of Sciences report.19  Because the criticisms were not 
“previously unknown” at the time of the trial, defense could not attack the 
judgment collaterally on the basis of that testimony.20 
III. AN INEFFECTIVE SYSTEM—FOCUSING ON THE PROSECUTOR 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant 
must first prove that counsel’s performance was deficient: that counsel made 
errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.21  If the failure to 
 
known error rates and therefore cannot even meet the low level of basic relevance under FED. 
R. EVID. 401) (2009); Radley Balko, How the Flawed “Science” of Bite Mark Analysis Has 
Sent Innocent People to Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.c
om/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/13/how-the-flawed-science-of-bite-mark-analysis-has-sent-
innocent-people-to-jail/ (citing the Innocence Project and reporting that 24 people have been 
exonerated after they were either convicted or arrested based on the wrongful assertions of a 
bite mark analyst). 
 17  See, e.g., Otero v. Warnick, 614 N.W.2d 177, 178 (2000), in Reality Bites: The Illusion 
of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369 (2009) (expert testified that only 
one person in the world could have inflicted the bite marks). 
 18  No. 482-C-1991, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. Unpub. LEXIS 488 (Pa. D. & C. Oct. 
28, 2010), aff’d, 34 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
 19  Id. at 32–33 (“Based upon the public information available and the contents of the 
NAS Report itself, this court determines that the information regarding studies indicating the 
lack of reliability of bitemark comparisons insofar as they purport to identify a particular 
perpetrator to the exclusion of any other individuals was information that was available to the 
defendant long before the filing of the Writ of Habeas Corpus/PCRA. . . .”).   
 20  Id.  
 21  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The defendant must also show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, that is, a trial whose result is reliable.  Id. 
ORENSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:58 PM 
2018]WHY PROSECUTORS RESIST CHALLENGES TO BAD SCIENCE 1145 
challenge expert testimony rises to the level of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the error must be obvious.  Logically, as competent practitioners, 
the prosecutor and the judge should have also been aware of the glaring 
deficiency.  When a defense counsel is ineffective, what does this say about 
the other actors in the courtroom? 
One might excuse the trial judge by claiming that judges do not 
understand science, and some evidence supports that assertion.22  But the 
notion of judicial scientific illiteracy or even reluctance to engage with 
complex science is at least somewhat belied by very sophisticated civil 
opinions, in which courts discuss complex scientific theories and claims.23  
The very different treatment that experts receive in civil tort cases versus 
criminal cases indicates that something deeper and more systemic is going 
on in criminal cases, and the treatment of experts may be closely tied to a 
culture of certitude and a pro-conviction bias.24 
Alternatively, perhaps trial judges understand the flaws in the expert 
testimony but choose to act as neutral arbiters, waiting to adjudicate disputes 
that criminal defense attorneys do not raise.  When no one objects, judges 
normally do not insinuate themselves into the presentation of evidence.  But 
defenders, who have the incentive to challenge the science, have 
significantly fewer resources to draw upon than those representing the state.  
 
 22  See Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Reform: 
More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 348 (2017) (noting a consensus that most 
state court judges do not understand basic Daubert concepts such as falsifiability and error 
rates). 
 23  See, e.g., Worrell v. Elliot & Frantz, 799 F. Supp. 2d 343 (D.N.J. 2011) (improper 
installation of wet kit in excavator); Graves v. Mazda Motor Corp., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1082 
(W.D. Okla. 2009) (auto design defect); Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235 (Md. 2008) 
(whether thimerosal-laden vaccines cause autism); In re Asbestos Litig., 900 A.2d 120 (Del. 
2006) (risk of contracting asbestos related disease from chrysoltile asbestos).  Many scholars 
have noted the irony that scientific testimony in civil cases is treated much more skeptically 
than scientific testimony in criminal cases.  See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in 
Criminal Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125 
(2003); Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 2, at 40 n.161 (comparing Mississippi’s rigorous 
attitude toward civil experts in med-mal and products cases to the lack of scrutiny in bitemark 
cases); Mnookin et. al., supra note 11, at 761 (observing that if courts applied Daubert to 
criminal cases with the same intensity and skepticism applied to toxic torts “there is little 
doubt that the forensic science community would have become forceful advocates for 
whatever research seemed necessary to justify admissibility”); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 
64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).   
 24  See infra Part III (discussing the culture of forensic evidence in the courtroom and the 
adherence to traditional forms of scientific testimony even when they do not comport with 
Daubert). See also Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testimony 
Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert and How to Make It Right, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 131, 132 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors fending off challenges to the reliability of their 
expert witnesses enjoy a success rate of ninety-two percent in trial courts and ninety-eight 
percent in appellate courts.”). 
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Aside from exceptional cases involving wealthy defendants,25 the prosecutor 
can regularly outspend and outmatch the accused.  A public defender’s 
ability to challenge scientific evidence is limited by crushing caseloads, 
insufficient training, and lack of funds for forensic experts, who could testify 
as well as help prepare cross-examination of government expert witnesses.26 
By far the most interesting actor in the courtroom when it comes to 
faulty expert testimony is the one who most often actively promotes it: the 
prosecutor.  As Professor Bennett Gershman has observed, “the prosecutor, 
for good or ill, is the most powerful figure in the criminal justice system.”27  
A prosecutor “has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate.”28  Both substantive law and ethical duties require 
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense,29 but the issue 
 
 25  Examples include the O.J. Simpson murder trial, and Bill Cosby’s first rape trial, but 
there are also some less well known examples where million dollar defenses led to acquittals. 
See e.g., Elizabeth Nix, 5 Infamous “Not Guilty” Verdicts, HISTORY.COM (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/5-infamous-not-guilty-verdicts; Gary Cartwright, 
How Cullen Davis Beat the Rap, TEX. MONTHLY (May 1979), http://www.texasmonthly.com/
articles/how-cullen-davis-beat-the-rap-2/ (discussing the enormous fees and defense tactics 
of Racehorse Hyanes).   
 26  Defenders do not have the investigative power of the police, as do prosecutors. Most 
importantly, they do not have access to vital discovery of scientific evidence– the type that is 
regularly available in civil cases.  See Paul C. Giannelli Pretrial Discovery of Expert 
Testimony 44 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN. The right to confrontation is hollow if the defenders 
have no meaningful basis on which to cross-examine the expert witness.  See generally  
Jennifer N. Mellon, Manufacturing Convictions: Why Defendants Are Entitled to the Data 
Underlying Forensic DNA Kits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1097 (2001) (arguing that trial courts should 
exclude the results of forensic DNA testing if the defendant lacks access to the scientific data 
supporting the testing method.”  Thanks to Professor Keith A. Findley for first raising this 
point at the conference in honor of Professor Michael Risinger. Anecdotally, defenders also 
have other fewer resources.  See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 2, at 33–34 (outlining the 
disabilities faced by indigent defendants in securing forensic experts and in facing police 
libraries).  My mother, Sylvia Orenstein, a retired Appellate Defender in New Jersey received 
access to Lexis, an online search engine, a full year after the district attorneys and attorney 
generals did. Letter from Sylvia Orenstein to author (undated) (on file with author). 
 27  BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT vi (2d ed. 2018). Interestingly, 
Professor Gershman’s comprehensive treatise on prosecutorial misconduct has almost no 
treatment of expert scientific testimony. 
 28  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“This 
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special 
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”); see 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (the role of a prosecutor is to see that justice 
is done; “It is as much [a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one.”).  Gershman also notes that prosecutors have “a special duty not to mislead.”  
GERSHMAN, supra note 27, at 10:27 (quoting United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153 (2d Cir 
1994)); ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS § 3-5.6(a) (“[P]rosecutor should not knowingly offer 
false evidence.”).  
 29  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that prosecution must turn over 
exculpatory evidence to the defense); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR 
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is considerably murkier when such evidence only becomes available post-
conviction and calls the conviction into question rather than undermining it 
entirely.30  On the issue of post-conviction obligations, the A.B.A. Model 
Code of Professional Conduct provides that prosecutors who secure a 
conviction have an ethical duty to come forward if “new, credible and 
material evidence” creates “a reasonable likelihood that a convicted 
defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was 
convicted.”31  The prosecutor must “undertake further investigation, or make 
reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the 
defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.”32  
But that duty has not always been enforced,33 and some jurisdictions apply 
the obligation differently in different circumstances.34 
One reason for bad science may be that prosecutors are as 
unsophisticated about science as everyone else in the courtroom, blindly 
accepting the pronouncements of experts.  It is clear, however, from the cases 
where prosecutors behave illegally and outrageously, that innocent 
misunderstanding of the science cannot provide a full explanation; 
sometimes prosecutors knowingly suppress exculpatory forensic evidence.35  
 
ASS’N 2017) (requiring prosecutors to “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence 
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the 
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor”).  
 30  Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor As Minister of Justice: Preaching to the 
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 35 (2009) (exploring the 
“minister of justice” theory and noting that “in the post-conviction sphere . . . few concrete 
principles exist to govern prosecutorial behavior after the conviction of a criminal 
defendant”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 174 (2005) (noting that there was little law defining prosecutors’ duties 
post-conviction). 
 31  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).   
 32  Id. The Rule also provides that “[w]hen a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing 
evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an 
offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the 
conviction.”  Id. at 3.8(h).   
 33  See Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Hanna, 513 S.W. 3d 175 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) 
(affirming the dismissal of disciplinary actions against a district attorney and assistant district 
attorney for not disclosing potentially exculpatory information to defendant post-conviction 
because of TEX. DISC. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.09(d), requiring prosecutors to timely disclose 
information known to the prosecutor tending to negate defendant’s guilt or mitigate offense 
did not impose a post-conviction duty of disclosure at the time of the conduct at issue).  
 34   Under California law, prosecutors must disclose Brady evidence in post-conviction 
death penalty and life without the possibility of parole cases.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9 
(West, Westlaw through 2003 legislation).  However, in other cases, where a defendant has 
received a life sentence with the possibility of parole, statutory law does not require such 
disclosures.  In re Scott, 61 P.3d 402, 417–18 (Cal. 2003) (reiterating that the nature and scope 
of discovery is generally resolved on a case by case basis). 
 35  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful 
Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U. D.C. L. REV. 275 (2004) 
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Regarding our focus on bad science in the courtroom, some prosecutors 
intentionally mischaracterize the evidence, violating their ethical duty to be 
candid to the tribunal and to avoid knowing misstatements of fact.36 
The behavior of prosecutors who knowingly act unethically and the 
behavior of prosecutors who resist admitting to and correcting mistakes that 
led to obvious unfairness at trial illuminate a systemic problem of denial.  
Such behavior suggests how some prosecutors will respond to motions for 
new trials based on changed science.  I explored the subject of prosecutors’ 
refusal to acknowledge mistakes in Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with 
Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence,37 
examining cases in which prosecutors engaged in stunning levels of denial 
and seemingly irrational attachment to the notion of the accused’s guilt 
despite stark DNA evidence excluding the convicted person as the 
perpetrator.38  Although significant differences exist between the effect of 
changed science and the conclusive exoneration offered by some DNA cases, 
there is every reason to believe such prosecutorial behavior in the DNA 
exonerations will carry over to new trial motions based on changed evidence. 
A. Institutional Pressures & Personal Needs 
Institutional and political pressures affect prosecutors’ willingness to 
admit error, encouraging them to resist acknowledging or even perceiving a 
conviction as wrongful.  Given the many frivolous claims of innocence that 
prosecutors encounter, they are understandably skeptical of such post-
conviction claims.  Prosecutors can be cynical to the point of hostility toward 
convicts, whom, as a class, many perceive as liars and whiners.39  They 
 
(documenting such failures to turn over exculpatory forensic and other evidence); Emily 
Bazelon, She Was Convicted of Killing Her Mother. Prosecutors Withheld the Evidence That 
Would Have Freed Her, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
08/01/magazine/she-was-convicted-of-killing-her-mother-prosecutors-withheld-the-
evidence-that-would-have-freed-her.html (discussing State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 
(Tenn. 2014), which overturned a conviction because of prosecutorial comment on the 
accused’s failure to take the stand, as well as the suppression of vital exculpatory evidence 
contradicting the testimony and questioning the credibility of the only witness against the 
accused). 
 36  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (prohibiting an 
attorney from making “a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”); id. at 3.3 (a)(3) 
(forbidding an attorney from offering “evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”).  
 37  Aviva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in 
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401 (2011).  
 38  Id. 
 39  Orenstein, supra note 37, at 423; CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE 
MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL 
ACTS 132 (2007) (discussing prosecutors’ cynicism because people lie to prosecutors all the 
time); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 512, 519 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors live in a world that constantly reinforces their 
perceptions that the defendants charged in their cases are all guilty.”).   
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express “the needle in a haystack disincentive,”40 believing that time spent 
on examining old convictions would pointlessly detract from protecting the 
public by securing new convictions.  Issues of finality and concern for 
victims and their families also play a vital role in prosecutors’ disinclination 
to reopen old cases.41  Even when prosecutors are caught not playing by the 
rules, they sometimes argue that the result was fair, and that the invalid 
inculpatory evidence or suppressed exculpatory evidence was just extra 
insurance to prevent an obviously guilty person from going free.42 
Pressures on prosecutors also arise from the desire to maintain 
allegiance to their office culture,43 remain team players, uphold their 
personal credibility, protect the image of the office, advance professionally,44 
and, in the case of elected officials, stay in power.45  Arguably, people who 
are attracted to prosecution possess personality traits that make it harder to 
confess error, such as high levels of confidence and competitiveness.46  
Furthermore, prosecutors’ tremendous power and discretion might shape 
their attitudes and worldviews over time, in some cases leading to a sense of 
 
 40  Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 148–50 (2004). 
 41  See Orenstein, supra note 37, at 405–06; Zacharias, supra note 30, at 219. 
 42  See id. at 432 n.169 (quoting TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 39, at 156) (“Apologize 
to them?  Give them money?  Don’t be absurd.  They got off on a technicality.  Oh, the 
technicality was DNA?  Well, they were guilty of something else.”); see Baker, supra note 
23, at 47 (“At one point I didn’t care who went to jail, because everybody was guilty of 
something.”). 
 43  See Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American 
Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 557, 559 
(2012) (footnotes omitted) (describing prosecutor offices as “competitive environments” in 
which “prosecutors vie with one another to see who can obtain the most convictions or the 
fastest jury verdicts” and those where “prosecutors competed to secure convictions, and a 
chart tallying wins and losses”); DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF 
A YOUNG D.A. 239 (1990) (describing the culture of his prosecutor’s office as rewarding 
bravado and frowning upon admitting ignorance or mistake).  
 44  See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2471 (2004) (“Favorable win-loss statistics boost prosecutors’ egos, their esteem, 
their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and career advancement.”); 
Medwed, supra note 40, at 136 (“Simply put, prosecutors may perceive (or fear the public 
will perceive) the post-conviction exoneration of an innocent prisoner as undermining the 
credibility of the office—and the person—that prosecuted that defendant.”); Barbara O’Brien, 
A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and 
Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1010 (2009) 
(noting that high conviction rates assist advancement; “winning is considered such a reliable 
indicator of work quality that some offices require a prosecutor to file a report explaining why 
a trial ended in acquittal, imposing no such requirement for convictions.”).   
 45  O’Brien, supra note 44, at 1010 (“High conviction rates bolster re-election campaigns 
and funding requests.”).   
 46  See Medwed, supra note 40, at 139–40 (discussing self-righteous and “gung-ho” 
attitude of prosecutors) (quoted in Orenstein, supra note 37 at n.118); Orenstein, supra note 
37, at 405 n.19. 
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self-righteousness, or in extreme cases, delusions of infallibility. 
B. Unconscious Bias & Denial 
Although prosecutors face considerable reputational consequence, 
personal angst, and peer pressure to win cases and hold onto convictions, it 
would be a mistake to see their subsequent denial of wrongful convictions as 
solely aimed at professional advancement, response to external pressures, or 
cynical manipulation of the justice system.  The problem is not as clear or as 
crass as Upton Sinclair’s famous dictum, “It is difficult to get a man to 
understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding 
it”47—though that bon mot might explain the behavior of some forensic 
odontologists.48 
Prosecutors often do not understand or cannot admit to themselves that 
they are overreaching or inappropriately ignoring evidence of innocence.  
The vast majority of prosecutors are not self-conscious rule-breakers, 
scheming to convict at all costs; rather, they confront serious psychological 
roadblocks that affect their judgment and cognition.  Prosecutors can fall 
victim to their own hype, experiencing confirmation bias49 and other 
psychological mechanisms that skew their judgment and ability to confront 
the evidence dispassionately.50 
 
 47  UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT LICKED 109 (1944). 
 48  See infra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliable and 
unmonitored “expertise” of forensic odontologists). One district court makes this very point 
about them, quoting Sinclair.  See Starks v. City of Waukegan, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1052 
(N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 49  Confirmation bias is a “tendency to search for and interpret information in line with 
one’s preconceptions.” Orenstein, supra note 37, at 425 (citing O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias, 
supra note 44, at 1011) (defining confirmation bias as a “tendency to seek and interpret 
evidence in ways that support existing or favored beliefs,” and noting that “[c]onfirmation 
bias connotes something more subtle and less conscious than the deliberate case building that 
any attorney must do to prepare for trial”); Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units 
Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 715–17 (2017) (discussing how prosecutors “spurned 
the Commission [on Future of DNA Evidence] recommendations, reflexively opposed testing, 
and unreasonably refused to vacate convictions even after court ordered post-conviction DNA 
testing produced powerful, exculpatory results” and discussing “this striking phenomenon and 
the cognitive psychology that underlies cases where prosecutors “irrationally refuse to admit 
error”). 
 50  Other relevant psychological mechanisms include “tunnel vision,” which describes 
how once a suspect is identified, contradictory evidence is more likely to be dismissed or 
minimized.  See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel 
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 492–94 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 354 (2006); see 
generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) (exploring confirmation bias, 
selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive 
dissonance, all types of cognitive bias that affect prosecutorial decision making and exercise 
of discretion).  
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Most poignantly, it is prosecutors’ best impulses that may lead them 
astray.  Their view of themselves as champions of justice makes prosecutors 
especially psychologically defended against charges of wrongful conviction.  
Their self-perception as those who fight on the side of the angels makes them 
particularly resistant to admitting error.51  The mistake of a false conviction 
challenges prosecutors’ self-concept; the error of a false conviction is simply 
too painful to admit.52  As Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson explain in their 
book, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), prosecutors often deny obvious 
evidence of post-conviction innocence or minimize the harm of a false 
conviction, believing that the accused probably committed some other 
crime.53  The only other option would be to acknowledge that the prosecutor 
sent an innocent person to prison, something so antithetical to a prosecutor’s 
self-concept.  Therefore, the prosecutor engages in tortured reasoning to 
argue that no mistake was made. 
Many of the same factors that lead prosecutors to resist DNA 
exonerations will influence the reaction to new trial motions based on 
changed science.  In rare cases, prosecutors will agree and support a motion 
for a new trial.  In other cases, however, they may perceive the presentation 
of advancements in science that question old verdicts as simply one more 
defense trick for allowing the guilty to re-litigate and go unpunished.  
Specifically, I think we can expect to see prosecutors responding to new trial 
motions based on unsupportable expert science in one of the following ways: 
they will (1) overvalue or mischaracterize the questionable evidence, arguing 
that it comports with current science; (2) minimize the role of expert 
testimony in gaining the conviction, assuring the court and themselves that 
the jury would have convicted without the expert testimony;54 or (3) question 
the new science itself.  This last option is discussed in Part III. 
 
 
 51  Although, to be fair, no one enjoys being wrong.  KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: 
ADVENTURES IN THE MARGIN OF ERROR 233–35 (2010) (discussing prosecutors’ reactions to 
exonerating DNA). 
 52  See Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable, supra note 37 at 402–03 (“Ironically, a 
prosecutor’s desire to do justice and the prosecutor’s self-image as a champion of justice 
render the fact of wrongful conviction particularly painful.  As a result, some prosecutors go 
to incredible lengths to deny the obvious rather than face the fact that the justice system failed 
and they may have contributed to that failure.”); see also Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-Judicial 
Prosecutors and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make 
Impartiality a Reality, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1620–21 (2013) (explaining that 
prosecutors often have difficulties with their dual responsibilities of freeing the innocent and 
convicting the guilty, especially when a prosecutor is “confronted with the heightened risk 
that her own, or her office’s, actions contributed to an innocent person being imprisoned”).   
 53  CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY 
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 131–33 (2007).   
 54  They will acknowledge what they characterize as minor or trivial inaccuracies but 
discount the effect of the flawed science on the overall verdict, arguing that justice was done. 
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One might imagine that it would be psychologically easier for 
prosecutors if the new trial motion is based on scientific knowledge to which 
no one had access at the time of the trial.  How could there be explicit or 
even implicit criticism of the prosecutor for not knowing the unknowable?  
Yet, a motion for new trial based on changed science challenges the entire 
case and, to a large extent, the prosecutor’s credibility and effectiveness.  
Because the conviction relied on many factors, it calls into question the 
performance of the prosecutor regarding the rest of the evidence, not just the 
scientific testimony.  Furthermore, the prosecutor in changed science cases, 
unlike DNA exoneration cases, can still credibly believe and argue that the 
result was just (even if some bad science arguments were credited to 
convict).  Prosecutors will also have institutional and administrative 
concerns beyond those involving DNA exonerations.  The use of a flawed 
science technique might have affected many cases and a tidal wave of new 
trial motions would overwhelm the system, particularly because old cases 
would be difficult to retry years later, given stale evidence and long-gone 
witnesses.  Finally, in some cases the bad science, while wrong and unfair, 
does not necessarily shake the court’s belief in actual guilt.55  This is 
especially so because the standard for post-conviction relief can be very 
high.56 
IV. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TOWARD NEW SCIENCE:  
ANTI-CRIME ORIENTATION AND TRADITIONALIST VALUES 
The notion of “changed science” means something different from mere 
new discoveries, understanding or techniques; it also implicates the culture 
of expert evidence in the criminal courtroom.  Bitemark analysis and 
microscopic hair analysis went routinely unchallenged not because they 
relied on solid foundations but because of their traditional and unexamined 
court acceptance by everyone—judiciary, prosecution and defense.  Despite 
Daubert, the “science” of the courtroom was intensively influenced by stare 
decisis and courtroom cultural norms.  The entrenchment of certain 
 
 55  Consider, for instance, State v. Prade, 9 N.E.3d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014), in which 
one expert opined that he did not believe more than one person could make the same bite mark 
and definitively attributed that bite mark to the accused. Id. at 1090. Later, DNA analysis 
based on improved scientific techniques excluded the accused’s saliva from the locus of the 
bite mark. Id. at 1110.  Nevertheless, based on eyewitness testimony and the accused’s history 
of violence against and stalking of the victim, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
exoneration remanding for an inquiry whether the petitioner established actual innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence on post-conviction relief. 
 56  Imwinkelried acknowledges the importance of the standard of review in determining 
how many cases will receive new trials based on changed science, but consciously saves that 
question for another day. See Imwinkelried, supra note 1 at 1103.  See also Scheck, supra 
note 49, at 733 (discussing various standards of review ranging from preponderance to clear 
and convincing). 
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questionable science reflects three interrelated phenomena.  First, it is an 
outgrowth of a pro-prosecution bias.  Second, it represents institutional 
inertia and an inclination toward the status quo and arguably, authoritarian 
tendencies, demanding certainty and allegiance to tradition, even in the face 
of hard scientific evidence to the contrary.  Finally, resistance to new science 
highlights a suspicion of the scientific method itself. 
Significantly, mistakes in admitting unreliable expert testimony in 
criminal cases appear to be unidirectional—they serve the prosecution.57  
Therefore, any challenges based on changed science would exclusively 
benefit the accused.58  New science may not only undermine confidence in 
past convictions, it may also make it harder for prosecutors to convict future 
defendants.  As then-Senator and now Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated 
concerning handwriting analysis, “I don’t think we should suggest that those 
proven scientific principles that we’ve been using for decades are somehow 
uncertain and leaving prosecutors having to fend off challenges on the most 
basic issues in a trial.”59  This statement has nothing to do with science and 
everything to do with easing the path of prosecutors towards conviction.60 
The reluctance to acknowledge scientific innovation, however, reflects 
more than the zero sum calculation that changed science is good for 
defenders and bad for prosecutors.  Rather, the hostility to new science in the 
courtroom, particularly science that challenges traditional practices, comes 
from a deep and deeply defended place.  In part, it reflects a fondness for the 
status quo as reflected in the ease of determining precedent and following 
stare decisis as opposed to the challenge of figuring out new (and often 
complicated and less accessible) science.  The resistance also arises from the 
fear that changed science disrupts traditional courtroom norms and questions 
 
 57  See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 2, at 34 (“[T]he presentation of forensic science 
during criminal trials is usually one-sided, provided only by analysts testifying for the 
prosecution.”).  I am unaware of mistaken expert testimony that exonerates.  Because of 
double jeopardy, any scientific mistake that exonerates an accused cannot be revisited on 
appeal. 
 58  Because of double jeopardy, the government cannot re-prosecute even if new science 
irrefutably pointed to the guilt of someone who was acquitted for the crime. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
 59  Radley Balko, Jeff Sessions Wants to Keep Forensics in the Dark Ages, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/04/11/jeff-
sessions-wants-to-keep-forensics-in-the-dark-ages/.  Sessions also expressed concern that 
“this is being thrown up to create the impression with a jury that there’s no basis for these 
kind of reports” which he had “always understood to be proven scientific techniques.” Id.   
 60  See D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or, A Fool’s Errand, By One of the 
Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and 
‘Forensic Science’ in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007) (eviscerating the value of handwriting evidence, 
noting that trial courts crave certainty and have turned a blind eye to commands of screening 
science when it comes to the bogus science of handwriting analysis). 
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established authority.61  The “truth” of mythical unchangeable science and 
the cult of experts who perform tests that lead inexorably to conviction have 
become enshrined in case law.  To challenge established courtroom science 
is to subvert authority, question long-accepted traditions, and impugn the 
quality of the justice that sent people to jail.62  The process of constant 
questioning, rethinking, and debunking threatens a rigid worldview that 
prizes certitude, distrusts challenges to authority, venerates tradition, and 
seeks to perpetuate the status quo.63  Courts tend to cite established legal 
authority and thereby ossify courtroom “science.”  At the extreme, such 
resistance is reflected in decisions to continue to accept questionable science 
via judicial notice.64 
The reluctance to credit changed science also arouses suspicion and 
skepticism about the scientific enterprise generally.  Such resistance may 
express itself not merely as an objection to the disruptive nature of new trial 
motions and their practical effect on prosecution, but as resistance to modern 
science itself.  Imwinkelried quotes Margaret Farrell for the proposition that: 
“Science came to be seen not as a gradual, relentless accumulation of 
knowledge . . . but as a succession of superseded theories.”65  This view of 
science comports with Daubert, which understands science as dynamic and 
 
 61  Cf. D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary 
Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. 
L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (disparaging the support of fingerprint evidence because of its 
longevity in the courts or the expert’s “professional judgment based on training and 
experience” as “junk science” and observing that such evidence “is not thoughtful, it is not 
rigorous, and it is not—whatever the term may ultimately mean—scientific”).   
 62  This is particularly true in the current approach of the Justice Department’s pro-
conviction, lock-’em-up-and-throw-away-the-key approach to criminal justice.  See Sari 
Horwitz & Matt Zapotsky, Sessions Issues Sweeping New Criminal Charging Policy, WASH. 
POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-
issues-sweeping-new-criminal-charging-policy/2017/05/11/4752bd42-3697-11e7-b373-
418f6849a004_story.html?utm_term=.436c8f963712. 
 63  See Imwinkelried, supra note 1; see M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The 
Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 85 (2016) (discussing “the lethal dissonance between scientific reality and legal 
precedent”); Mnookin et. al., supra note 11, at 731, 747 (“Forensic science needs to focus 
more on science than on law, to shift from a quasi-adversarial perspective to a research 
orientation.”; “Many forensic scientists, as well as many judges, are too willing to infer 
scientific validity from the fact of longstanding use.”).   
 64  See e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262–63 (Ky. 1999) (“Based upon 
the overwhelming acceptance of this evidence [microscopic hair analysis] by other 
jurisdictions, as well as our own history of routine admission of this evidence at trial, trial 
courts in Kentucky can take judicial notice that this particular method or technique is deemed 
scientifically reliable.”); Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 63, at 115 (noting the intersection 
of science and law—where science becomes ossified and judicial notice is taken).  
 65  Imwinkelried, supra note 1 at 1095 (quoting Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 
2194 (1994)). 
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self-correcting.66  Not every jurisdiction follows Daubert, however; instead 
some jurisdictions adopt the Frye standard, which is inherently conservative 
and prefers deferring to expert guilds rather than exploring knowledge or 
assuring accuracy.67  For instance, one Pennsylvania court opined that as a 
“Frye State” it looked for “‘general acceptance’ in the particular community 
from which it derives” and “the scientific reliability of bitemark evidence 
and bitemark identification is irrelevant, so long as the methodology, 
techniques, and analysis have gained ‘general acceptance’ in the community 
of forensic odontologists.”68 
Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where Daubert theoretically applies, 
many courts cling to orthodoxy and certitude, failing to examine experts’ 
conclusions as long as the discipline has been acknowledged by past courts.69  
Starks v. City of Waukegan,70 citing Michael Risinger, noted the lack of 
scientific support for bitemark evidence and its failure to comply with 
Daubert.71  The court observed that nevertheless state “courts have regularly 
accepted bite mark evidence—including in all three States in the Seventh 
Circuit.”72  Illinois is a Frye State, but Indiana and Wisconsin theoretically 
follow Daubert.73  Even under Daubert, it takes time for the legal doctrine 
to catch up.74 
The debate over changed science also reflects larger current intellectual 
and cultural scientific debates.  Those resisting scientific challenges to 
previously accepted forensics conceive of science as providing absolute truth 
 
 66  Mnookin et. al., supra note 11, at 743 (“Claims of knowledge should be taken as 
provisional and subject to revision in the face of new information. Dogma should be 
resisted.”).   
 67  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 68  Commonwealth v. Kunco, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. Unpub. LEXIS 488, at *25 
n.11 (Pa. D & C. Oct. 28, 2010), aff’d, 34 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (emphasis added).   
 69  See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 2, at 33 (“At least in criminal cases, having found 
that the underlying discipline is satisfactory and the evidence admissible following the Frye—
or now the Daubert—standard, courts do not typically examine conclusions experts reach on 
the stand regarding whether statistical claims or others inferences drawn from the data are 
supported by the evidence.”). 
 70  123 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 71  Id. at 1052. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Recent Indiana cases seem to credit bite mark analysis.  See Jacobs v. State, 2 N.E.3d 
116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 22 N.E.3d 1286 (Ind. 2015) (finding substantial independent 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including that “the bite marks on [the minor’s] penis 
matched Jacob’s pattern of missing teeth.”); Davis v. State, 2014 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1142 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2014) (finding “independent evidence” of guilt, including 
testimony of a forensic odontologist who testified that the injury on the victim’s cheek was a 
bite mark).   
 74  See Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses 
to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 300 (2013) (noting that despite 
significant criticism forensic odontology continues to be admitted in court).   
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akin to religious belief.  Such true believers are the opposite of the skeptical 
testers who engage in the scientific method.  In resisting challenges to 
handwriting, fingerprints, microscopic hair analysis and bite marks, 
opponents display almost a religious, creationist fervor committed to the 
notion that each individual is identifiably and unmistakably unique.  They 
accept, unproven as an unshakable axiom, that God has made no set of 
fingerprints or set of teeth alike. 
Those certain about the value of forensics used to convict will brook no 
challenge.  Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ Justice Department has 
disbanded panels formed by the Obama administration to examine forensic 
science.75  Attorney General Sessions did not renew the charter of the 
National Commission on Forensic Science.76  Similarly, the Trump 
administration also terminated pilot studies to test bitemark and firearm 
analysis as well as a Justice Department project to craft guidelines for 
forensic testimony.77  The skepticism of science encouraged and exacerbated 
by Trump’s administration and Sessions’s Justice Department reflects deep 
cultural rifts in epistemology, worldview, and the point of a trial.78  To be 
fair, Attorney General Loretta Lynch, though striking a more temperate tone, 
also declined to adopt the recommendation from the Presidents’ Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology.79  However, the criticism of Professor 
Paul Giannelli has taken on even greater force in the current Trump 
administration: 
 
 75  To be fair, this may not be about science alone; any innovation of the Obama 
administration is considered an abomination.  One good predictor of President Trump’s policy 
is that he is always inclined to do the opposite of his predecessor.  See Peter Baker, Can Trump 
Destroy Obama’s Legacy?, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06
/23/sunday-review/donald-trump-barack-obama.html.  Nevertheless, there is something 
beyond the glee of undoing Obama’s legacy that animates the disbandment of the scientific 
panels.  
 76  Levy, supra note 9 (concluding of the Trump administration: “The message was clear: 
The era of independent scientific review of forensics is over.”).  During its four years, the 
Commission—which included lawyers, judges, academics, law enforcement, and forensic 
experts—issued “dozens of recommendations on forensic standards, testing, and 
accreditation,” including new accreditation policies for Justice Department labs. Levy, supra 
note 9.   
 77  Id.  
 78  See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement 
Control of Scientific Research, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 57 (2001) (Scientific values are often 
antithetical to law enforcement values—or at least frequently perceived to be so by 
prosecutors and police. In particular, the notion of transparency has repeatedly been trumped 
by an adversarial process that favors trial by ambush. . . . The DOJ, the FBI Crime Laboratory, 
and some prosecutors have attempted to shape science by controlling the research agenda, 
hiding unwelcomed test results, attacking legitimate studies that were considered unfavorable, 
harassing scientists who disagreed with them, and “spinning” these issues in the press.”). 
 79  See Shniderman, supra note 22. The Trump Administration has removed the page 
containing the Presidents’ Council from the White House’s website. 
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The government has not only failed to conduct the needed 
research, it has thwarted efforts to do so.  Indeed, the conduct 
described in this Article rivals that of some private corporations 
such as the tobacco industry254—shaping the research agenda, 
limiting access to data, attacking experts who disagree with its 
positions, and “spinning” negative reports.  Currently, we have the 
worst of two possible worlds.  Basic research in the forensic 
sciences is weak, and the only agency currently capable of funding 
research, the DOJ, is sabotaging efforts to conduct rigorous 
independent studies.80 
V. WHAT WILL MAKE THE CRIMINAL TRIAL MORE RECEPTIVE TO 
CHANGED SCIENCE? 
A. Sanctions on Prosecutors Will Not Work 
Although some scholars call for sanctions on prosecutors as a means of 
enforcing ethical courtroom behavior, many despair of the state disciplinary 
authorities as the correct vehicles for imposing discipline or effectuating 
change.81 As a practical matter, prosecutors rarely face any negative 
consequence for outrageous behavior regarding obvious misuse of science 
or even suppression of evidence.82  The lack of any consequence is 
particularly true in post-conviction phase where prosecutors’ obligations are 
less clear.  If the possibility of sanctions is ineffective in deterring nakedly 
unethical behavior, it will certainly have no effect on a prosecutor’s 
 
 80  Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement 
Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 90 (2011). 
 81  See supra note 33 (citing an example where a prosecutor who ignored ethical 
requirements suffered no consequence); see also Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct 
in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 398, 403 (2009) (citing Bennett L. 
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 444–54 (1992) for the suggestion 
that an independent prosecutorial conduct commission be formed); Yaroshefsky, Wrongful 
Convictions, supra note 21, at 297; Gershman supra note 27, at vi (“Restraints on 
prosecutorial misconduct are either meaningless or nonexistent”; “the available sanctions are 
sparingly used and even when used have not proved effective.” Misconduct is commonly met 
with judicial passivity and bar association hypocrisy.”). 
 82  See Minsker, supra note 81, at 398 (documenting that in California “out of eight death 
penalty cases reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, five prosecutors have ‘no public record 
of discipline,’ and one prosecutor is a sitting judge”); Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions, 
supra note 35, at 276–77 (footnote omitted) (discussing the case of Ron Williamson whose 
wrongful conviction was obtained by prosecutorial suppression of evidence, for which no 
prosecutor was disciplined; “Scholars and other commentators agree that discipline for 
prosecutors is rare and that there are few, if any, consequences for the prosecutorial 
misconduct”).  But cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 721, 778 (2001) (concluding that “the traditional lamentations regarding the absence 
of bar discipline are somewhat overblown, but also contain a large measure of truth”; also 
expressing skepticism of the utility of exhortations to be good or do justice).   
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willingness to consider the effect of new science. 
Sanctions and even education will not deter prosecutors who have 
convinced themselves they are right and that the accused is guilty.  In the 
case of truly new science (something that I argue in Part II may be hard to 
define), there is, theoretically, nothing and no one to sanction.  The scientific 
knowledge was simply inadequate at the time of trial.  Nevertheless, a 
wrongful conviction based on flawed science may still impugn the 
prosecutor, indicating that multiple mistakes or misdeeds occurred at trial all 
leading to a wrongful conviction.  In attempting to uncover those mistakes 
and argue that they mattered, those who adopt a censorious attitude toward 
the prosecution will find it counterproductive. 
B. Best Practices for an Effective System of Motions for New Trials 
Based on Changed Science 
The institutional resistance exhibited by some prosecutors and judges 
in the DNA exonerations, where even clear-cut evidence of wrongful 
conviction was denied or explained away, predicts how many of these actors 
will respond to challenges based on changed science in the fields of bite 
marks, microscopic hair analysis, and other areas where the science has 
developed to discredit previous expert testimony.  To assure that motions for 
new trials based on the use of superseded science receive a fair hearing, we 
must reconfigure the institutional rewards83 and appeal to prosecutors’ self-
image as champions of justice. Ideally, all prosecutors should react this way: 
“The citizens of this community need to know that the District Attorney’s 
Office considers exonerating an innocent person as important as [convicting] 
a guilty one.”84 But experience indicates that we should not count on it. 
Strategically, we should avoid attacking the prosecution and instead 
petitioners should credit scientific progress for the need to revisit the 
convictions.85  Those representing the convicts seeking new trials should 
emphasize the newness of the science and highlight that it was unknown at 
the time of prosecution.86  This way, prosecutors do not have to apologize or 
 
 83  See Medwed, supra note 40, at 135–36, 171–72 (citing Erwin Cherminsky’s work 
about prosecutors’ incentives and his suggestion that the decision to grant promotions 
consider and reward the prosecutor’s attempts to rectify errors). 
 84  Gene Warner & Matt Gryta, Man Jailed Nearly 7 Years for ‘84 Rape Is Exonerated, 
BUFFALO NEWS, June 22, 2010, at A1. 
 85  Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2121 
(2010) (discussing the “rhetoric [of] the wrongful conviction literature” and arguing that it 
“alienates the very parties who hold the power to initiate many of the most promising reforms 
of the movement: prosecutors”). 
 86  I advocate this strategic approach even though realistically the line between known 
bad scientific testimony and changed science is hard to draw. See Part I; see also 
Imwinkelried, supra note 5 (presenting the Texas and California statutes). 
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confess error (which as noted above will be resisted to an astounding 
extent)87 but instead can be praised for pursuing justice.88 
Prosecutors’ desire to avoid wasting time and money and the 
institutional drive to insulate convictions are important factors in their 
resistance to revisiting convictions.  Obviously, sound moral arguments 
indicate that cost alone cannot be used to justify keeping an innocent person 
in prison.  However, to address the issue, given the cost of incarceration, the 
state may actually save money by participating in post-conviction review.89  
Similarly, issues of finality which sometimes dictate that a case cannot be 
re-litigated ad nauseum, are not convincing where an unknowable change in 
science questions the justice of the verdict.  Such arguments about finality 
work best when the accused could have raised objections and did not. 
The new California and Texas statutes allow for new trials, presumably 
by motion by the person convicted with faulty science.  This raises practical 
questions concerning who will identify cases, present them to the court, and 
pay for the whole process.  It is essential that some institutional actor has the 
time to review cases, decide which ones deserve new trials based on changed 
science, and actually bring the cases forward. To accomplish these goals the 
petitioner must (1) fully understand the science, and (2) have some incentive 
to pursue the question. 
As noted in Part II, individual public defenders often seem ill-equipped 
in knowledge, funding, support, and time to challenge convictions based on 
changed science.  It is doubtful that individual defense attorneys could 
realistically screen and handle all their previous bite mark and microscopic 
hair cases, let alone the many other types of dubious science used to convict 
their former clients.  Furthermore, given the stressful and crushing caseloads 
of current cases, putting the burden on the original defender seems unfair and 
impractical. 
Tasking individual prosecutors with moving for new trials also seems 
highly problematic.  As Professor Zacharias persuasively argued, 
prosecutors are “ill-equipped to analyze post-trial obligations on their own” 
 
 87  See supra Parts III A & B (describing prosecutors’ reactions to DNA exonerations). 
For instance, when Alan G. Northrop and Larry W. Davis were released after seventeen years 
of incarceration based on DNA exoneration, the prosecutor stated: “The reason we don’t feel 
an apology is appropriate is that we feel the cases were prosecuted professionally.” Laura 
McVicker, Officially Free After 17 Years: Men Finally Shed Rape Charges, COLUMBIAN 
(Vancouver, Wash.), July 15, 2010, at A1. 
 88  See Medwed, supra note 40, at 156–70 (discussing cases where prosecutors turned 
their willingness to exonerate into a political win, something that is admittedly easier to do if 
another suspect emerges). 
 89  See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less 
Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561 (2013) (analyzing costs 
of post-trial review and arguing that expanding defendants’ rights on post-trial review can 
often conserve state resources and improves vital perception of fairness in the legal system).   
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so that prosecutors cannot be relied on to resolve difficult ethical problems 
without guidance or supervision.90  He and many others have argued for the 
creation of independent bodies or divisions within the prosecutor’s office.91  
Under this approach, the best practice would establish an independent unit 
that would respond to all post-conviction claims, rather than assign the 
matter to general appeals, or worse yet, plop it back on the desk of the 
prosecutor who tried the case.92  Prosecutors who were not involved in the 
original case will be more dispassionate in reviewing the merits of the case 
and less likely to engage in confirmation bias and to see the faulty science as 
harmless.  Furthermore, independent prosecutors will not have to personally 
face the daunting prospect of retrying the case, which would be a strong 
disincentive to recommending a new trial based on changed evidence. 
Professor Barry Scheck advocates for “Conviction Integrity Units, 
“independent, well-funded government entities,” such as the Criminal Court 
Review Commission in the United Kingdom and the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry.93  Ideally, he would like to see such units housed outside 
prosecution offices with a heavy presence of defenders.94  Given the current 
climate against criminal defendants, federal law enforcement’s reluctance to 
examine traditional courtroom forensic science, and hostility to questioning 
the righteousness of prosecutors or police, the chance of a truly independent 
unit, especially on the federal level, seems close to zero.  Attorney General 
Sessions has disbanded the academic inquiry into various forensic sciences, 
so it seems even less likely that he would support efforts to challenge 
individual convictions based on new science he does not want to know about.  
The gold standard of independent review, independent laboratories, 
independent experts, and a scientifically literate bench and bar seems more 
elusive than ever.  At the very least, however, the California and Texas 
provisions for new trial offer a mechanism for reconsideration of convictions 
based on flawed science. 
 
 
 90  Zacharias, supra note 30, at 174–75; see also Keith Swisher, Prosecutorial Conflicts 
of Interest in Post-Conviction Practice, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 181 (2012) (arguing that 
prosecutors suffer from a conflict between their duty to justice and their duty to themselves—
their duty to seek the release of the innocent person and their interest in avoiding 
embarrassment and liability for themselves and their offices). 
 91  See Medwed, supra note 40, at 175–77. 
 92  Zacharias, supra note 30, at 174–75 (citing the absence of clear legal standards, lack 
of incentives, and complexity of the notion of justice in the postconviction context).   
 93  Scheck, supra note 49, at 710. 
 94  Scheck, supra note 49, at 710. 
